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MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS
UNDER NEW YORK CHILD SUPPORT
STANDARDS ACT
Barbara Gonzo*
INTRODUCTION

In New York, the primary hurdle in modifying existing child
support awards has been satisfying a threshold change of
circumstances test. In the landmark case of Boden v. Boden,1 the
New York Court of Appeals held that where the prior child support
award was based upon a separation agreement, the party seeking
additional support must establish either a substantial change in
circumstance which was "unanticipated and unreasonable," or that
2
the agreement was not fair or equitable when entered into.
3
Thereafter, the New York Court of Appeals, in Brescia v. Fitts,
eased that standard somewhat, holding that modification could also
be justified if the combination of the custodial parent's income and
4
the child support award was insufficient to meet the child's needs.

* Ms. Gonzo has been a Principal Appellate Court Attorney for the
Appellate Division, Second Department, for many years, and is a member of the
Legislation Committees of the Brooklyn Bar Association and the New York
Women's Bar Association, and of the Matrimonial and Family Law Committee
of the New York Women's Bar Association. The views expressed in this article
are purely her own.
1. 42 N.Y.2d 210, 366 N.E.2d 791,397 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1977).
2. Id at 213,366 N.E.2d at 794, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
3. 56 N.Y.2d 132,436 N.E.2d 518, 451 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1982).
4. See id at 140, 436 N.E.2d at 521, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 71; see also
Michaels v. Michaels, 56 N.Y.2d 924, 926, 439 N.E.2d 321, 321, 453 N.Y.S.2d
605, 605 (1982) (stating that it is sufficient to establish that "a change in
circumstances has occurred warranting the increase in the best interests of the
child").
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The change in circumstances test is not limited to New York; it
is also implemented in other states. 5 The existence of such a test in
New York and other states has merited attention from Congress. In
the Federal Family Support Act,6 Congress mandated that each
state establish guidelines for child support awards and apply those
guidelines, except in cases where there was a written finding that

5. See Child Support Enforcement Programs, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,559, 61,560
(1942) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 302-03); see, e.g., Burson v. Burson, 608
So. 2d 739, 741 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (holding that child support shall be
modified upon a showing of a material change of circumstances that is
substantial and continuing); Brown v. Brown, No. 90-2465SI, 1992 WL 10783,
at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 1992) (stating this court is authorized to modify
a child support order upon a substantial change in circumstances of either
party); Kirchen v. Kirchen, 595 So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding that husband's increased earnings and wife's increased needs as
children became older were substantial changes in circumstances warranting an
upward modification of child support); In re Marriage of Riegel, 611 N.E.2d 21,
23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating an increase in average monthly cost of raising
two children was substantial change of circumstances); In re Marriage of
Chmelicek, 480 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (stating that where
inflation provision was within original decree, cost of living should not be
considered as contributing to material and substantial change in circumstances);
Blackburn v. Blackburn, 638 So. 2d 252 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that even
though no change of circumstances occurred, the trial court's modification of
support was not in error); Foster v. Foster, 843 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that although there was a change in parties' income it was not
substantial enough to justify upward modification of father's child support
obligation); Schuett v. Schuett, No. A-92-499, 1993 WL 460553, at * I (Neb.
App. Nov. 9, 1993) (stating applicant must prove a material change of
circumstances has occurred since the dissolution to obtain a modification of
child support award); Olmer v. Olmer, 507 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Neb. App. 1993)
(holding "modification of a child support award is not justified unless the
applicant proves a material change of circumstances has occurred since the
dissolution"); Parzynski v. Parzynski, 620 N.E.2d 93, 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
(upholding finding of change in circumstances warranting upward modification
where proper calculation of child support based on current combined annual
gross income of former spouse would result in greater than ten percent deviation
from current support order); Payne v. Dial, 831 S.W.2d 457, 458 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992) (determining that "[i]n order to modify a child support order, the movant
must show that there has been a material change in the circumstances of the
children or of the parents since the time the order was entered").
6. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (1989).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss2/12

2

1995]

Gonzo: Support Modifications
SUPPORTMODIFICATIONS

application of the guidelines would be "unjust or inappropriate. ' '7
Further, the Federal Family Support Act contains provisions which
require that states enact procedures to provide for periodic
adjustment of child support orders "not later than 36 months after
the establishment of the order or the most recent review ... in
accordance with" specific guidelines. 8
In order to comply with federal law, the New York State
Legislature enacted the Child Support Standards Act [hereinafter
the CSSA], 9 which went into effect on September 15, 1989, for the
purpose, in the words of the New York State Legislature, of
establishing "guidelines that permit judicial discretion, and
establish minimum and meaningful standards of obligations that
are based on the premise that both parents share the responsibilities
for child support." 10 What follows is an examination of how the
CSSA, as amended, can be harmonized with other statutory
provisions governing modification of child support awards, and the
case law interpreting those provisions.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Provisions of the Domestic Relations Law and Family Court Act
state that an application to modify an award of child support in a
matrimonial action must be based upon a "substantial change in
7. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (1989). "A written finding or specific finding on

the record that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate
in a particular case, as determined under criteria established by the State, shall
be sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case." Id
8. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(10)(B) (1989). The United States Department of
Health and Human Services has indicated that the existence of a change of
circumstances test "has frequently meant the need for an adversary proceeding
and protracted litigation to demonstrate the occurrence of a sufficient change in

circumstances" and has "contributed to many awards remaining unchanged
throughout the life of the order and thus, inadequate or inappropriate with the
passage of time." Child Support Enforcement Programs, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,559,
61,560 (1992) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 302-03).
9. See 1989 N.Y. Laws 567; see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240
(McKinney 1986); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 413 (McKinney 1983).
10. 1989 N.Y. Laws 567.
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circumstance." 1 1 The Family Court generally has concurrent

jurisdiction to "entertain" applications to modify awards of child
support made by "order of the supreme court or of another court of
competent jurisdiction," but only where "changed circumstances
12
require such modification."
When the CSSA first went into effect, its application to all new
child support orders entered after its effective date, September 15,
1989, was mandatory, but in modification proceedings, its
application was only permissive. 13 Then, effective July 25, 1990,
the CSSA was amended to make its application mandatory in all
cases where a court deemed it necessary to modify an existing
14
child support award.
The courts held that, as a matter of public policy, the CSSA
should be applied, not only to new applications for child support
made on or after its effective date, September 15, 1989, but
retroactively to new applications brought prior to the effective date
which have not been "finally decided" on direct appeal. 15 When
11. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(9)(b) (McKinney 1986). Matrimonial
actions are defined as actions for an annulment or dissolution of a marriage, for
a divorce, for a separation, for a declaration of the nullity of a void marriage, or
for a declaration of the validity or nullity of a foreign judgment of divorce. Id.
§ 236(B)(2).
12. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 461(b)(ii) (McKinney 1983).
13. See 1989 N.Y. Laws 567; Steel v. Steel, 152 Misc. 2d 880, 579
N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990). "All orders for child support,
entered after September 15, 1989, must be made pursuant to the Child Support
Standards Act, which amended [Domestic Relations Law] § 236(B)(7), DRL
240 and § 413 of the Family Court Act to provide a method by which courts are
to determine the amount of child support." Id.
at 881, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
14. 1990 N.Y. Laws 818. See Howard v. Howard, 186 A.D.2d 132, 587
N.Y.S.2d 950 (2d Dep't 1992).
The 1990 amendment... changed the character of the Act from
permissive to mandatory with respect to modification applications, and
we have held.., that the tenor of the legislation and the public policy
behind it dictated the application of the Act to appeals pending on July
25, 1990, the date of the 1990 amendment.
Id. at 134, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
15. See, e.g., Fetherston v. Fetherston, 172 A.D.2d 831, 834, 569 N.Y.S.2d
752, 755 (2d Dep't 1991) (stating that "the paramount interests" of children in
need of support and the "important public policy" of the CSSA justify this
retroactive application to suits commenced prior to the effective date but not
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the CSSA was amended to make its application mandatory in all
cases where a court deemed it necessary to modify an existing
child support award, that amendment was also applied retroactively
to applications brought prior to the effective date of the
amendment, July 25, 1990, which, as of that date, had not been
"finally decided" on direct appeal. 16
Although the CSSA provides that "where the circumstances
warrant modification" the guidelines "shall" apply in setting the
new award, 17 the same paragraph specifically states that "[i]n any
action or proceeding for modification of an order of child support
existing prior to [its] effective date" the enactment of the CSSA
itself "shall not constitute a change of circumstances warranting
modification." 18 In 1993, the CSSA was amended to provide that
where a child receives public assistance or services from the
"finally decided"); Gelb v. Brown, 163 A.D.2d 189, 191, 558 N.Y.S.2d 934,
937 (lst Dep't 1990).
16. Howard, 186 A.D.2d at 134, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 951 (stating that CSSA
must be applied to appeals pending on the date of the amendment); Borgio v.
Borgio, 186 A.D.2d 131, 131, 587 N.Y.S.2d 951, 952 (2d Dep't 1992) (stating
the important public policy justifies application of CSSA to pending appeals
even though the matter was commenced prior to the effective date of the Act);
Maddox v. Doty, 186 A.D.2d 135, 135, 587 N.Y.S.2d 948, 949 (2d Dep't 1992)
(stating the "remedial nature" of the CSSA justifies retroactive application);
Rathbun v. Winchell, 183 A.D.2d 948, 949, 583 N.Y.S.2d 314, 315 (3d Dep't
1991) (stating that the 1990 amendment applies to matters not only pending
before trial court on effective date of amendment, July 25, 1990, but also to
appeals pending on that date); Valek v. Simonds, 174 A.D.2d 792, 793, 570
N.Y.S.2d 711, 711 (3d Dep't 1991) (applying act where appeal has not reached
final judgment); Weber v. Weber, 172 A.D.2d 901, 902, 568 N.Y.S.2d 882, 882
(3d Dep't 1991) (remanding for reconsideration under the 1990 amendment);
Squires v. Squires, 171 A.D.2d 990, 991 n.1, 567 N.Y.S.2d 931, 932 n.1 (3d
Dep't 1991) (applying amendment on remittal where Hearing Examiner's
decision was rendered subsequent to amendment).
17. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §240(1-b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 413(l)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994). See Contino v. Ryan, 193
A.D.2d 1057, 1058, 598 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (4th Dep't 1993) (holding that
where the petitioner failed to show "a change of circumstances warranting
modification," the CSSA does not apply).
18. N.Y. DOM. REL. LANV § 240(1-b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 413(l)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
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Support Collection Unit, 19 a party may apply for modification

every thirty-six months. Additionally, it provided that "[a] new
support order shall be issued" if the old award deviates at least
10% from the amount calculated pursuant to the CSSA, or "the last
permanent support order does not provide for the health care needs
of the child through insurance or otherwise." 2 0
An exception to this rule arises where the old award was made
after the effective date of the CSSA and did not comply with the
guidelines at the time, "due to a finding by the court that such
19. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 1l-h(1) (McKinney 1992). This section
provides that "[e]ach social services district shall establish a support collection
unit.., to collect, account for and disburse funds paid pursuant to any order of
child support or child and spousal support" issued under Domestic Relations
Law article 3-a, Domestic Relations Law §§ 236 or 240, or Family Court Act
article 4, 5, or 5-a. Payments made to the Support Collection Unit on behalf of a
petitioner who does not receive public assistance "shall... be deemed for all
purposes to be the property of the person for whom such money is to be paid."
Id.
20. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(4) (McKinney 1992); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 413(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994); 1993 N.Y. Laws 59. Under the CSSA, all
new child support orders "shall prorate each parent's share of future reasonable
health case expenses of the child not covered by insurance in the same
proportion as each parent's income is to the combined parental income." N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 413(1)(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1994). See Slankard v. Chahinian, 204 A.D.2d
529, 530, 611 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (2d Dep't 1994) (stating it was error to
"deduct the [son's] psychiatric care expenses from the basic child support
amount and to direct that the former husband and the former wife to pay 60%
and 40% of this expense, respectively"); Gibbons v. Gibbons, 199 A.D.2d 1085,
608 N.Y.S.2d 901 (4th Dep't 1993) (stating that the court "erred in failing
to... direct[] respondent to pay his pro rata share of future reasonable health
care expenses of the children not covered by insurance"). Other statutory
provisions permit a court to direct a party in a matrimonial action to "purchase,
maintain or assign a policy of insurance providing benefits for health and
hospital care and related services." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(8)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1994). Other statutory provisions require
that if any legally responsible relative has health insurance available
through an employer or organization that may be extended to cover any
persons on whose behalf the petition is brought and such employer or
organization will pay for a substantial portion of the premium on any
such extension of coverage, the order of support shall require such
responsible relative to exercise the option of additional coverage.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 416 (McKinney 1992).
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application was unjust or inappropriate." 2 1 In that situation, "the
support collection unit shall consider, in establishing such
adjustment, whether the factors" which originally justified
'22
deviation from the guidelines "still exist."
The 1993 amendments relating to modification track the
language of the federal regulations, which provide that, effective as
of October 13, 1993, the states, when providing child support
enforcement services, must have in place "a process for review and
adjustment of child support orders," 2 3 "[n]otify each parent subject
to a child support order in the State of the right to request a
review," 24 "publicize the right to request a review as part of its
support enforcement services,"' 25 and "[lr]eview child support
orders at 36 month intervals... unless" neither parent asks for the
review, or, if the child is not on public assistance, review would
not be in the best interests of the child.2 6 These regulations permit
the states to require that a petitioner establish that the original child
support deviates from the guidelines by a "reasonable quantitative
standard" before an adjustment is necessary. 27 In New York, the
"reasonable quantitative standard" is ten percent. 28 Deviations
from the guidelines are permitted where,
21. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(4) (McKinney 1992); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 413(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
22. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(4) (McKinney 1992); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 413(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994).

23. 45 C.F.R § 303.8(c)(1) (1993).
24. 45 C.F.R. § 303.8(c)(2).
25. 45 C.F.R. § 303.8(c)(3).
26. 45 C.F.R. § 303.8(c)(4).

27. 45 C.F.R. § 303.8(d)(1)(i).
28. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; cf CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-86 (West 1986) (rebuttable presumption that a deviation from guidelines
by amounts of 15% or more justifies modification); Mo. ANN. STAT.

§ 452.370(1) (Vernon 1986) (deviation from guidelines by amounts of 20% is
prima facie proof of a change in circumstances justifying modification); Schuett
v. Schuett, No. A-92-499, 1993 WL 460553, at *2 (Neb. App. Nov. 9, 1993)
(deviation from guidelines of 10% or more which have lasted six months and
can reasonably be expected to last an additional six months establishes a
rebuttable presumption of a material change in circumstances which could
warrant modification).
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the inconsistency is due to the fact that the amount of the current
child support award resulted from a rebuttal of the guideline
amount [i.e., a finding that application of the guidelines would be
unjust or inappropriate] and there has not been a change in the
circumstances which resulted in the rebuttal of the guideline
29
amount.
Moreover, under the regulations, the "need to provide for the
child's health care needs ... through health insurance or other
means, must be an adequate basis under State law to petition for an
adjustment of an order to provide for the children's health care
30
needs."
Under the CSSA, a finding that application of the guidelines
would be "unjust or inappropriate," must be based upon
consideration of a variety of factors. 3 1 Where the prior award was
29. 45 C.F.R. § 303.8(d)(1)(ii) (1993).
30. 45 C.F.R. § 303.8(d)(3). "In no event shall the eligibility for or receipt
of Medicaid be considered to meet the need to provide for the child's health care
needs in the order." Id.
31. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1994). The factors provided
include:
(1) The financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent, and
those of the child; (2) The physical and emotional health of the child and
his/her special needs and aptitudes; (3) The standard of living the child
would have enjoyed had the marriage or household not been dissolved;
(4) The tax consequences to the parties; (5) The non-monetary
contributions that the parents will make toward the care and well-being of
the child; (6) The education needs of either parent; (7) A determination
that the gross income of one parent is substantially less than the other
parent's gross income; (8) The needs of the children of the non-custodial
parent for whom the non-custodial parent is providing support who are
not subject to the instant action and whose support has not been deducted
from income [in determining the guidelines amount] provided, however,
that this factor may apply only if the resources available to support such
children are less than the resources available to support the children who
are subject to the instant action; (9) Provided that the child is not on
public assistance (i) extraordinary expenses incurred by the non-custodial
parent in exercising visitation, or (ii) expenses incurred by the
non-custodial parent in extended visitation provided that the custodial
parent's expenses are substantially reduced as a result thereof; and (10)
Any other factors the court determines are relevant in each case.
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based upon "a validly executed separation agreement or stipulation
of settlement," the court "may consider," in determining whether a
new award based upon the guidelines would be "unjust or
inappropriate," provisions of the agreement or stipulation relating
to the equitable distribution of property and maintenance. 32 The
CSSA further provides that a "validly executed agreement or
stipulation" must contain a provision acknowledging that the
parties have been advised of the terms of the CSSA.33 In 1992, that
provision was strengthened to provide that if the CSSA amount is
not used in the agreement or stipulation, the amount of child
support which would have been awarded under the CSSA must be
set forth, as well as the reasons for deviating from that amount, and
the court, in the order awarding child support, must reiterate the
34
reasons for deviating from the CSSA amount.
In 1993, Social Services Law section 111-h was also amended,
in conformity with the federal regulations, to require the Support
Collection Unit to notify persons receiving its services of "their
right to seek an adjustment," 35 and to require the Support
Collection Unit to "initiate an adjustment review," unless (1) the
child is on public assistance and there has been a finding that
review would not be in the best interest of the child, or (2) the child
is not on public assistance and neither party has requested it.3 6
Further, the provisions of the CSSA specifically relating to
modification of old awards were amended in 1993 to provide that
Id
32. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §240(1-b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y.
FAM. CT. AcT § 413(1)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
33. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(h) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y.
Faro. Ct. Act § 413(1)(h) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
34. 1992 N.Y. Laws 41. See Contino v. Ryan, 193 A.D.2d 1057, 1058, 598
N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (4th Dep't 1993) ("[P]etitioner aclowledged that she was

aware that the Child Support Standards Act was in existence at the time she
entered into the original oral stipulation [and thus], there is no merit to her
contention that the stipulation is invalid."); Sloam v. Sloam, 185 A.D.2d 808,
809, 586 N.Y.S.2d 651, 653 (2d Dep't 1992) ("A finding that either party was
unaware of the CSSA will ...
invalidate an agreement which does not comply
with its mandates").
35. N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW § 11 1-h(17) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
36. N.Y. SoC. SERv. LAW § I11-h(12); 1993 N.Y. Laws 59.
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modification may be had not only where the court finds that the
"circumstances warrant modification," but also (1) where the
adjustment is sought by the Support Collection Unit or, (2) if the
child receives public assistance or services from the Support
'37
Collection Unit, upon the request of "either of the parties."
Thus, under the 1993 amendments, once a party receives services
from the Support Collection Unit, the periodic adjustment of child
support awards is guaranteed, unless the old award only varies
from the guidelines amount by less than ten percent or application
of the guidelines would be "unjust or inappropriate." In New York,
a person who is not receiving aid to families with dependent
children may seek support enforcement services from the Support
Collection Unit by filing an application prescribed by the
Department of Social Services or an application in court in a
proceeding for the "establishment of paternity and/or establishment
and/or enforcement of a support obligation." 3 8 Further, any
application for child support, or for modification or enforcement of
an order awarding child support
for persons not in receipt of aid to dependent children must
contain either a request for child support enforcement services,
[under Social Services Law section 11 l-g, i.e., services of the
Support Collection Unit] ... or a statement that the applicant has

applied for or is in receipt of such services; or a statement that the
applicant knows of the availability of such services, and has
declined them. 39
The regulations promulgated by the Department of Social
Services state that the services of the Support Collection Unit
"must be made available to any individual not otherwise eligible"
upon the receipt of such an application. 40 Where a party is
delinquent in his or her child support payments, the other parent is
entitled to the services of the Support Collection Unit, since
services available upon application include collection and
37. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(/) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
38. N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 11 1-g (McKinney 1992).
39. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(7)(b), (9)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
40. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 347.17(a) (1992).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss2/12

10

1995]

Gonzo: Support Modifications

SUPPORTMODIFICATIONS

495

enforcement of child support obligations. 4 1 However, in addition
to "assistance in the preparation and filing of support, paternity,
[and] violation" petitions, another service available upon
application is assistance in the preparation and filing of
"modification petitions as required."'42 Thus, even where a parent
is current in his or her child support payments, the other parent can
apply for services from the Support Collection Unit, and obtain
upward modifications under the liberal 1993 standards.
II. THE CASE LAW ON MODIFICATION
A question arises as to whether these statutory amendments can
be reconciled with older provisions in the Domestic Relations Law
and Family Court Act relating to modification, and the case law
interpreting those provisions. In the landmark decisions of Boden
v. Boden43 and Brescia v. Fitts,44 the initial award of child support
was made in a matrimonial action and modification was sought in
family court pursuant to the Family Court Act section 461, which
permits the family court to modify an award of another court based
upon "changed circumstances."'45 However, to further complicate
matters, the principles enunciated in those cases have been
extended to cases where the initial child support award was based
upon a stipulation of settlement in family court, 4 6 and no
"matrimonial action," and therefore no quidpro quo over equitable
distribution of property, was involved.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

N.Y. COMp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 347.17(c)(2), (3), (4), and (5).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 347.17(c)(2).
42 N.Y.2d 210, 366 N.E.2d 791, 397 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1977).
56 N.Y.2d 132,436 N.E.2d 518, 451 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1982).
See Brescia, 56 N.Y.2d at 140, 436 N.E.2d at 521, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 71

(holding that a change in circumstances may require a modification of child
support); Boden, 42 N.Y.2d at 213, 366 N.E.2d at 794, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 708
(stating that absent a change in circumstances, the agreement should not be
modified).
46. See Panic v. Hert, 200 A.D.2d 748, 607 N.Y.S.2d 86 (2d Dep't 1994)
(granting modification of a support order because of a change in circumstances
even though order was based on a stipulation); Dinkins v. Mabry, 194 A.D.2d
787, 599 N.Y.S.2d 620 (2d Dep't 1993) (modifying a stipulation agreement
based on a change in circumstances).
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Under the change in circumstances test, the common
circumstances warranting modification are: (1) a change in the
financial status of the noncustodial parent, (2) a change in the
financial status of the custodial parent, and (3) a change in the
needs of the child. When establishing that the needs of the child
have increased, generalized claims of increases due to the child's
maturity or inflation are insufficient. 47 Rather, "specific increases
in the costs related to the child's basic necessities of food, shelter,
clothing, and medical and dental needs, as well as to the expenses
associated with the child's varied interests and school activities"
must be established. 4 8 A custodial parent's testimony as to
47. Tuchrello v. Tuchrello, 613 N.Y.S.2d 86, 87 (4th Dep't 1994) (stating
that "[d]efendant failed to offer proof that the children are not being provided
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical and dental care"); Panic,200
A.D.2d at 748, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 87 (stating that the party seeking upward
modification "must show more than a generalized claim of increased need based
on inflation"); Healey v. Healey, 190 A.D.2d 965, 968, 594 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (3d
Dep't 1993) (stating that although there was an increase in respondent's income
since the divorce it did not warrant upward modification); Miller v. Davis, 176
A.D.2d 945, 946, 575 N.Y.S.2d 681, 682 (2d Dep't 1991) (upholding upward
modification where petitioner provided specific dollar amounts of the increases
for many items of basic necessity as well as expenses associated with varied
interests and school activities); Labita v. Labita, 147 A.D.2d 535, 536, 537
N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (2d Dep't 1989) (stating "defendant's claim of increased
need is based entirely on the impact that inflation has had on the economy in
general since support payments were first fixed and not at all on the specific
needs of the child"); Deacutis v. Cuomo, 79 A.D.2d 595, 433 N.Y.S.2d 566 (2d
Dep't 1980) (noting that "[n]either a significant increase in the supporting
spouses income, nor the generalized claim that the children's needs have
increased as they have matured and/or because of inflation.. ." warrants
upward modification).
48. See Tyler v. Minott, 614 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769 (2d Dep't 1994) (upholding
Hearing Examiner's determination that mother had established change in
circumstances warranting upward modification of father's support obligation for
daughter where mother testified previous robberies justified moving to more
expensive and safer apartment); Hulik v. Hulik, 201 A.D.2d 909, 909, 607
N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (4th Dep't 1994) (stating the general rule that to justify
upward modification the petitioner must show "specific increases in the costs
related to the child's basic necessities of food, shelter, clothing, and medical and
dental needs, as well as to the expenses associated with the child's varied
interests and school activities"); Dinkins, 194 A.D.2d at 788, 599 N.Y.S.2d at
621 (upholding upward modification where mother had made specific showing
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increased needs may not be enough, "without documentary or other
supporting proof."49 Further, if the custodial parent is claiming
of increased costs of basic necessities, varied interests and educational expenses
as well as an increase of the father's income six years after the stipulated
agreement); Tribley v. Tribley, 178 A.D.2d 819, 820, 577 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539
(3d Dep't 1991) (stating that petitioner's testimony that child's needs had
increased due to growth and increased participation in school and social
activities did not constitute change in circumstances warranting upward
modification as "petitioner failed to submit proof detailing the specific items of
increased expense and demonstrating that the combination of his income and the
current support payments made by respondent did not adequately meet the
child's needs"); Miller, 176 A.D.2d at 946, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 682 (upholding
upward modification where petitioner "provided the specific dollar amounts of
the increases for many items, rather than relying on generalized claims of
increases due to the child's maturity or inflation"); Certain increased expenses
relating to the child's interests may not be considered sufficient, if they are not
necessities, and are attributable to the fact that the child's interests have changed
with increased maturity. See, e.g., Koczaja v. Koczaja, 202 A.D.2d 849, 609
N.Y.S.2d 365 (3d Dep't 1994) (holding minor changes in parental income
during a ten month period, standing alone, is not sufficient to demonstrate a
change in circumstances warranting upward modification of child support);
Healey, 190 A.D.2d at 965, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 90 (skating lessons merely
attributable to increased needs of a growing child); Griffin v. Janik, 185 A.D.2d
635, 636, 586 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (4th Dep't 1992) (holding summer camp elective
not sufficient to justify upward modification). But see Zucker v. Zucker, 187
A.D.2d 507, 508, 589 N.Y.S.2d 908, 910 (2d Dep't 1992) (holding that
increased expenses related to music lessons, karate lessons, football, Hebrew
School, Bar Mitzvah lessons, and summer camp justify increase in child
support); McFarlane v. McFarlane, 182 A.D.2d 1024, 583 N.Y.S.2d 58 (3d
Dep't 1992) (holding that increased expenses relating to scouting, church
activities, school trips, and enrollment of an academically talented child in an
enrichment program at a local community college justified increased child
support).
49. See Kinsella v. Kinsella, 614 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (4th Dep't 1994)
(stating "[t]he conclusory assertions of plaintiff of increased costs related to
basic necessities of food and clothing for the child resulting from his maturing,
without documentary or other supporting proof, are insufficient... "); Webb v.
Webb, 197 A.D.2d 847, 848, 602 N.Y.S.2d 275, 275 (4th Dep't 1993) (stating
that plaintiff failed to meet burden where her testimony consisted of
"generalized claims" without documentary proof that child's needs increased
with maturity); cf Vitek v. Vitek 170 A.D.2d 908, 566 N.Y.S.2d 738 (3d Dep't
1991). In Vitek, a mother was able to support her claims of increased need with
the corroborative testimony of her daughter, and her testimony that she required
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increased costs of shelter, the courts may examine whether the
increase was necessary. Some courts have held that "the fact that
the petitioner has moved into a more expensive home does not
'50
warrant an increase in child support."
Where the prior child award is not based upon an agreement, and
the Boden test 51 is not applicable, a "substantial improvement" in
the noncustodial parent's income and financial condition "is, in
and of itself, a sufficient ground to sustain an increase in child
support. ' ' 52 However, where the prior award was set by an
agreement, and the Boden test is applicable, an increase in the
noncustodial parent's income is not sufficient.53 In order to
establish that the child's needs are not being met, the custodial
parent must present specific monetary proof of the needs of the
child, and that the income of the custodial parent together with the
child support award are insufficient to meet those needs. 54 That
financial assistance from her father and brother to meet her children's needs. Id.
at 909, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
50. Tripi v. Faiello, 195 A.D.2d 958, 600 N.Y.S.2d 876 (4th Dep't 1993)
(stating that "[a]n increase in child support is not warranted simply because
respondent is now making more money or because petitioner has moved into a
more expensive home"); Rogers v. Bittner, 181 A.D.2d 990, 990, 581 N.Y.S.2d
945, 946 (4th Dep't 1992) (stating that increase in child support not warranted
by fact that petitioner has moved into a more expensive home); cf Popp v.
Raitano, 167 A.D.2d 404, 405, 561 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (2d Dep't 1990). In
Raitano, the court held that an increase in child support was warranted where
the mother was "forced" by her former landlord to move out of her $250 per
month apartment, and moved into an apartment costing $800 per month. Id
51. See supranote 1-2 and accompanying text.
52. See Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 203 A.D.2d 829, 829, 611 N.Y.S.2d 357,
358 (3d Dep't 1994) (citing Chariffv. Carl, 191 A.D.2d 795, 796, 594 N.Y.S.2d
377, 377 (3d Dep't 1993)). In Sorrentino, the initial award, set by agreement,
was later modified upward by a California court. Thus, the mother sought
modification yet again in New York, where the rules applicable to awards set by
agreement were not applied. Id.
53. See, e.g., Brooker v. Brooker, 615 N.Y.S.2d 156 (4th Dep't 1994)
(stating that although there was a 44% increase in defendant's income plaintiff
failed to make specific showing of increased needs of children).
54. Dinkins v. Mabry, 194 A.D.2d 787, 788, 599 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (2d
Dep't 1993) (stating that mother demonstrated change in circumstances and that
the original child support in addition to her income did not meet child's needs);
Berg v. O'Leary, 193 A.D.2d 732, 733, 597 N.Y.S.2d 733, 734 (2d Dep't 1993)
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burden may be met by showing either increased needs of the child
or a "substantial" decrease in the custodial parent's income. 55
Loss of employment by the noncustodial parent is generally a
sufficient ground to decrease child support, whether or not the
initial award was set by agreement. 5 6 Similarly, loss of
employment by the custodial parent may warrant upward
modification. 57 However, the party seeking modification based
upon a loss of employment will have to show that the loss of
employment was involuntary, 58 and the position lost cannot be
replaced with another.59 Similarly, a reduction in salary or other
(stating that mother was awarded upward modification where she testified to
increased expenses as a result of growing children and an increase in the cost of
living as well as substantial improvements in father's financial condition);
Murrin v. Murrin, 186 A.D.2d 567, 569, 588 N.Y.S.2d 371, 373 (2d Dep't
1992) (stating that father's increase in income and increased costs of growing
children did not justify upward modification absent showing of need).
55. See Michael N.G. v. Elsa R, 199 A.D.2d 81, 604 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1st
Dep't 1993) (finding father's modest increase in earnings and mother's
substantial reduction in earnings constituted a "change in financial
circumstances" warranting upward modification).
56. See Meyer v. Meyer, 205 A.D.2d 784, 785, 614 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (2d
Dep't 1994) (stating that where father lost job through no fault of his own and
diligently sought reemployment, a downward modification of his child support
obligation was warranted).
57. See Valek v. Simonds, 174 A.D.2d 792, 793, 570 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712
(3d Dep't 1991) (finding mother's loss of employment, resulting in a reduction
in income from $22,000 per year to $184 per week constituted a substantial
change in financial circumstances warranting upward modification).
58. See case cited supra note 56; see also Monroe County Dep't of Social
Servs. v. Bennett, 178 A.D.2d 974, 578 N.Y.S.2d 733 (4th Dep't 1991) (noting
that "[tihe CSSA expressly provides for imputing income where a former
spouse unilaterally attempts to diminish the obligation to support children by
voluntarily ceasing employment") (citations omitted); Ms. B. v. Mr. K., 158
Misc. 2d 817, 601 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Fam. Ct. Ulster County 1993) (downward
modification not justified where husband took advantage of "involuntary
termination package").
59. See Patten v. Patten, 203 A.D.2d 441, 441, 610 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (2d
Dep't 1994) (possibility that custodial parent would lose part-time job did not
justify upward modification until it was clear the job could not be replaced);
Lantz v. Lantz, 147 Misc. 2d 100, 103, 553 N.Y.S.2d 609, 612 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1990) (custodial parent's unsupported allegation that she was unable to
obtain part-time work for six months was insufficient to justify upward
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income can constitute a change of circumstances. But where the
reduction was caused by a change of employment, there must be
evidence that the loss of the higher-paying employment was
involuntary, 6 0 and the party seeking modification "made a good
faith effort to obtain [new] employment commensurate with his [or
her] qualifications and experience."'6 1 The CSSA permits
imputation of income to a parent "if the court determines that a
parent has reduced resources or income in order to reduce or avoid
[his or her] obligation for child support."' 62 Nevertheless, when
opposing downward modification, a motive "to reduce or avoid" a
modification); see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(b)(5) (McKinney
Supp. 1994); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(b)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1994). If the
parent received workers' compensation, disability benefits, unemployment
insurance benefits, social security benefits, or a pension or retirement benefits in
lieu of a salary, those benefits count as income. Id. Social Security disability
payments paid to the children are credited against the parent's child support
obligation. See, e.g., Graby v. Graby, 196 A.D.2d 128, 131, 607 N.Y.S.2d 988,
990 (4th Dep't 1994) (noting that the majority view in New York is that social
security payments made to the children should be credited to non-custodial
parent's obligation).
60. See Westwater v. Donnelly, 204 A.D.2d 467, 468, 612 N.Y.S.2d 58, 59
(2d Dep't 1994) (stating that where father brought expensive gifts for son, paid
for luxury automobile in cash, went on three trips to Hawaii, and left higherpaying job to start his own business did not justify downward modification);
Alfano v. Alfano, 151 A.D.2d 530, 531, 542 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (2d Dep't 1989)
(stating that change in father's financial condition brought about by his own
action or inaction warrants denial of downward modification).
61. See Stempler v. Stempler, 200 A.D.2d 733, 734, 607 N.Y.S.2d 111, 112
(2d Dep't 1994) (stating that lawyer's adverse financial condition created by a
decision to abandon practice of law to pursue a career in real estate speculation
did not constitute "good faith effort to work in employment commensurate with
qualifications and experience") (citations omitted); Davis v. Davis, 197 A.D.2d
622, 623, 602 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673 (2d Dep't 1993) (stating that husband turning
down food service work to landscape and be outdoors did not constitute "good
faith effort to obtain employment commensurate with his qualifications and
experience") (citations omitted).
62. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §240(1-b)(b)(5)(v) (McKinney 1986); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 413 (1)(b)(5)(v) (McKinney 1983). See Berg v. O'Leary, 193
A.D.2d 732, 597 N.Y.S.2d 733 (2d Dep't 1993) (imputing $16,000 to the
custodial parent); Monroe County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Carpenter, 178
A.D.2d 974, 578 N.Y.S.2d 733 (4th Dep't 1991) (recognizing the provision
giving the capability to impute income).
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child support obligation need not be shown, since the cases hold
that a reduction in income "brought about solely by the party's
own action or inaction" does not constitute a ground for downward
63
modification.
A change in custody can also be considered a change of
circumstances warranting modification. Furthermore, if the initial
award of custody and child support was made in one agreement,
the change of custody would probably be considered "not
anticipated."' 64 If a change in custody results in a split custody
arrangement, with each parent retaining custody of one or more
children, then each parent's "child support obligation must be
determined on a per household basis," 6 - "with the controlling
percentage for each such home determined according to how many
66
children are living with the same custodial parent."
Further, the birth of additional children in a second family can
also constitute a change of circumstances warranting

63. See Alfano, 151 A.D.2d at 531, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 314 (stating that
adverse change in party's financial condition brought about by party's own
action or inaction warrants denial of downward modification); see also
Westwater, 204 A.D.2d at 468, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 59 (stating a downward
modification would have the effect of making the child subsidize his father's
financial decisions).
64. Alice C. v. Bernard G.C., 193 A.D.2d 97, 110, 602 N.Y.S.2d 623, 631
(2d Dep't 1993) (stating that addition of son to mother's household after son left
father's household due to argument was deemed a material change in
circumstances not anticipated by the stipulation of settlement warranting
modification of father's child support).
65. Griffim v. Janik, 185 A.D.2d 635, 636, 586 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (4th Dep't
1992) (stating that "[tjhe basic child support obligation must be determined on a
per household basis 'with the controlling percentage for each such home
determined according to how many children are living with the same custodial
parent"') (citations omitted).
66. Commissioner of Social Servs. of N.Y. v. Raymond S., 180 A.D.2d
510, 513, 581 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1st Dep't 1992). Thus, if one child resides with
each parent, each parent's child support obligation is based upon 17% of income
(the "child support percentage" for one child), rather than 12.5% (one-half the
"child support percentage" for two children). See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 240(1-b)(b)(3) (McKinney 1986); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413 (1)(b)(3)
(McKinney 1983).
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modification. 67 However, in that case, the deviation from the
guidelines amount must be based upon a finding that the guidelines
amount is "unjust or inappropriate." Such a finding may only be
made if "the resources available to support" the children in the
second family are less than the resources which are available to
support the children who are the subject of the child support
proceeding. 6 8 In determining the resources available to support the
second family, the assets of the children of the second family and
69
the assets of other members of the household may be considered.
A parent's entry into a written agreement to support another
child "for whom the parent has a legal duty of support" or the entry
of a child support order against the parent for such a child could be
considered a change in circumstances. This results because the
CSSA provides that child support actually paid pursuant to such an
agreement or court order shall be deducted from income in
determining the basic child support obligation. 70 However, this
provision should not apply where a parent enters into an agreement
or consents to entry of a court order to support a child living in his
or her current household. 7 1 In such a case, it would appear that the
67. See Michael M. v. Judith M., 148 Misc. 2d 712, 561 N.Y.S.2d 870

(Fam. Ct. Bronx County 1990) (stating that the birth of twins constitutes a
"significant change of circumstances").
68. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(f)(8) (McKinney 1986); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 413 (1)(f)(8) (McKinney 1983). See Cox v. Cox, 181 A.D.2d 201,

585 N.Y.S.2d 841 (3d Dep't 1992) (stating that the needs of an extra child are
only considered if allocation of child support is unjust or inappropriate).

69. See In re Josephine M., 151 Misc. 2d 1010, 754 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Fam. Ct.
N.Y. County 1991). The family court stated that in determining "resources"
available to the second family, one must take the "income," as defined in the
CSSA, of both parents and deduct the "self-support reserve." Id; N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(b)(6) (McKinney 1986); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413
(1)(b)(6) (McKinney 1983); see also Farley v. Farley, 114 A.D.2d 703, 494

N.Y.S.2d 546 (3d Dep't 1985) (stating that the court could consider the income
of the father's female companion as a factor); Boden v. Luccese, 83 A.D.2d
636, 441 N.Y.S.2d 539 (2d Dep't 1981); Felisa L.D. v. Allen M., 107 Misc. 2d
217, 433 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Fam. Ct. Bronx County 1980).
70. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(b)(5)(vii)(D) (McKinney 1986); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 413 (1)(b)(5)(vii)(D) (McKinney 1983).

71. Fantanzo v. Decker, 614 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Fam. Ct. Monroe County 1994)
(stating that to give a deduction for the amount of child support would be
against the intent of the legislature).
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parent is attempting to circumvent the intent of the CSSA; that is,
the needs of the children of a noncustodial parent's new intact
family only warrant reduction of child support obligations where
72
application of the CSSA would be "unjust or inappropriate.",
III. HARMONIZATION OF THE CSSA WITH PRIOR
CASE LAW AND STATUTES
The 1993 amendments to the CSSA and Social Services Law
permit a parent receiving services from the Support Collection Unit
to seek an adjustment every three years. The amendment also
requires adjustment of the guidelines amount if the award no
longer conforms to the guidelines by at least ten percent or if the
last permanent child support order does not provide for the health
care needs of the child. 73 Where the old award deviates from the
guidelines by at least ten percent, the only clear exception from
applicability of the guidelines arises where the prior award
deviated from the guidelines based upon a finding that application
of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. This provision
tracks the language of the federal regulations, which provide that
an inconsistency between the child support award and the amount
which would be awarded under the guidelines would not warrant
adjustment if "the inconsistency is due to the fact that the amount
of the current child support award resulted from a rebuttal of the
guideline amount and there has not been a change in the
circumstances which resulted in the rebuttal of the guideline
amount." 74
72. Id. at 672.
73. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
74. 45 C.F.R. § 303.8(d)(1)(ii) (1993). See also 57 Fed. Reg. 61,559,
61,565 (1942) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 302-03). As was noted in the
Federal Register:

This exception recognizes the existence of cases in which the amount of
child support was initially established using guidelines, but the court or

administrative authority determined that the amount presumed to be
correct was unfair or inappropriate, and set an amount which varies from
the guideline amount. Consequently, reapplication of the guidelines in
such cases may always reflect inconsistency simply because the amount
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If a party receiving services from the Support Collection Unit
applied for modification before the three-year hiatus was up, a
court would then have to find "a change of circumstances
warranting modification." '75 Presumably, in such cases, the case
law concerning what constitutes a change of circumstances would
apply. However, once an award based upon an agreement was
modified by court order, any subsequent modification would no
longer have to satisfy the stringent Boden test, because the child
76
support would no longer be based upon an agreement.
Under the 1993 amendments, a safeguard does remain to
preserve the effectiveness of separation agreements and
stipulations of settlement. In any application to modify an award
based upon an agreement, even one made pursuant to the 1993
provisions, which permit such applications every three years, the
court still may consider any provisions in the agreement
concerning distribution of property or maintenance in determining
whether application of the guidelines would be "unjust or
inappropriate."' 77 Presumably, if the separation agreement or
stipulation of settlement contains no provisions relating to property
or maintenance, once three years have passed, then its existence
will not serve as any bar to the modification of the child support
award. If there are provisions relating to property and maintenance,
the fairness of child support provisions in a separation agreement
or stipulation of settlement will be subject to review every three
years, based upon the new circumstances arising in that time
of the current support award was established as a rebuttal of the guideline

amount.
Id.
75. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(1) (McKinney 1986); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 413 (1)() (McKinney 1983).
76. See Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 203 A.D.2d 829, 611 N.Y.S.2d 357 (3d
Dep't 1994) (sustaining the Hearing Examiner's modification of an agreement

that was previously modified by the court without specifically holding that there
was a change in circumstances); cf Lenigan v. Lenigan, 159 A.D.2d 108, 110,
558 N.Y.S.2d 727, 728 (3d Dep't 1990) (holding that because plaintiff was not
seeking modification of a separation agreement or judgment of divorce, it was
not necessary to show a change in circumstance).
77. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(1) (McKinney 1986); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 413 (1)(/) (McKinney 1983).
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period. Further, if the separation agreement or stipulation of
settlement makes no provision for the health care needs of the
child, the child support award will be modified to provide for those
needs.
The periodic examination of the fairness of old agreements will
generally serve the best interests of the child. Although the less
stringent Brescia test permits the modification of child support set
by agreement if the combination of the custodial parent's income
78
and the child support is insufficient to meet the child's needs,
some cases have distinguished between needs and luxuries, 79 and
necessary increases in costs versus unnecessary increases in
costs. 80 What constitutes a need or a luxury, except for the barest
necessities of food and shelter, is dependent on the standard of
living. The reexamination of the fairness of old agreements in light
of current circumstances would help to ensure that an increase in
the noncustodial parent's income and standard of living would
result in an increase in the child's standard of living. However, a
problem does arise when the noncustodial parent has acquired a
second family. In such cases, the reexamination of an old
agreement based upon an increase in income could mean an
increase in standard of living of children by a former spouse, to the
detriment of children by the current spouse.

78. Brescia v. Fitts, 56 N.Y.2d 132, 436 N.E.2d 518, 451 N.Y.S.2d 68
(1982). The court held that several factors are to be used in determining whether

the combination of custodial income and child support is adequate. See
Michaels v. Michaels, 56 N.Y.2d 924, 439 N.E.2d 321, 453 N.Y.S.2d 605
(1982) (stating that it is not necessary to show a change in circumstances that is
unanticipated and unreasonable to justify an increase in child support).
79. See Koczaja v. Koczaja, 202 A.D.2d 849, 609 N.Y.S.2d 365 (3d Dep't
1994) (stating that cost of gifted and talented program is insufficient to justify
increase in child support); Healey v. Healey, 190 A.D.2d 965, 594 N.Y.S.2d 90
(3d Dep't 1993) (stating that the cost of skating lessons is insufficient to justify
increase in child support); Griffin v. Janik, 185 A.D.2d 635, 586 N.Y.S.2d 49
(4th Dep't 1992) (holding that it must be shown that summer camp is a form of
child care and not an elective luxury).
80. See cases cited supranote 47 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The 1993 amendments to the CSSA encourage use of the
Support Collection Unit, since the applicability of the more liberal
modification provisions is contingent upon whether the parties are
using the services of the Support Collection Unit. However, the use
of such services can mean a bureaucratic delay in forwarding child
support payments to the custodial parent. 81 A petitioner seeking
modification must weigh such disadvantages against the
advantages of liberal 1993 standards for modification. Requiring a
petitioner who does not need enforcement services and wants only
a reexamination of an old award to seek the services of the Support
Collection Unit may seem like a bureaucratic hurdle which makes
little sense. But it only underscores the fact that the 1993
amendments were enacted, not in response to perceived inequities
in prior New York law, but in response to federal mandate.

81. See, e.g., B.S. v. M.S., 160 Misc. 2d 627, 610 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Fam. Ct.
N.Y. County 1994) (recognizing an inexplicable delay by the Support
Collection Unit in forwarding payments).
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